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Abstract: One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to
cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the
coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players affect
the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model these exclusions in cooperative
game theory, the excluded coalitions value (ϕE value) was introduced. This value is based on the
Shapley value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. In this
article, we deduce some properties of this new value. After some general results, we analyze the apex
game that could be interpreted as a team situation and the glove game that models markets where
sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees have a common interest for
cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the market players of the scarce side
to a higher extent.
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1. Introduction
One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to
cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is
the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players
affect the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model this, the ϕE value (excluded
coalitions value) for cooperative games was introduced and axiomatized [1]. This value is based on
the Shapley value [2] and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. The ϕE
value enhances the approaches developed by [3] to model that players prefer some other players for
cooperation.1 Whereas the approach by [3,5] modifies the coalitional function of the game, the model
by restricts the set of admissible permutations of players. For modeling the preferences of players,
both models are insufficient. Assume a parliament with three parties. One party is located on the left,
one party is on the right and one party is in the middle. The left and the right parties exclude coalitions
with each other. The party from the middle admits cooperation with both parties. In the models
by [3,5] the left and the right parties are connected via the middle party. Hence, all parties cooperate.
Using the ϕE value, the excluded coalition between the left and the right players is considered in a
way that precludes a coalition of all three players.
1 Another enhancement of the approach by [3] was introduced by [4]. In this model, incompatible players are linked by an
arc of the graph. As well as in the models by [3,5] , every coalition (especially the grand coalition) obtains a worth—the
maximum that could achieved by the compatible players of the coalition. In the model by [4], loops or parallel arcs are not
intended. This limitation does not exist when calculating the ϕE value. In addition, a further analysis of stable coalition
structures based on the excluded coalition partners [6,7] may be complicated if the worth of the grand coalition, for example,
is a superadditive hull.
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The articles by [8,9] analyzed situations where each player could decide to exclude coalitions to
all other players. Using exclusions of coalitions strategically was analyzed by [10,11]. In these articles,
a non-cooperative game models the strategic decision of players whereas the values of cooperative
game theory determine the payoffs at the last stage.
Since the ϕE value is a new value, there are many fields of research with fruitful questions.
One major question is how excluding of coalitions influences the players’ payoffs. For weighted
majority games, this question was addressed in [1]. In this article, we deduce the influence of excluding
coalitions on the players’ ϕE payoffs. We start with some general games (monotone games) and, in the
final stage, we analyze the apex game that could be interpreted as a team situation and glove games
that models markets where sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees
have a common interest for cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the
market players of the scarce side to a higher extent.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Basic definitions of cooperative game theory
are presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we present our results. Section 4 concludes.
2. Basic Notation
A game is a pair (N, v) and N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the player set. The coalitional function v assigns
every subset K of N a certain worth v (K) , reflecting the economic abilities of K (i.e., v : 2N → R)
such that v (∅) = 0. A game is called monotone if v (T) < v (S) , for all T ⊂ S, T, S ⊆ N. A game
is convex if v (T ∪ {i}) − v (T) < v (S ∪ {i}) − v (S) , for all T ⊂ S, T, S ⊆ N and i /∈ S. A game
(N, v) is designated symmetric or anonymous, if a function f :N→ R exists such that v(K) = f (|K|)
for all non-empty sets K ⊆ N. Hence, the number of players determines the worth of a coalition.
The cardinality of N is called n or |N| .
One important value for games (N, v) is the Shapley value. To calculate the player’s payoffs,
rank orders ρ on N are used. They are written as (ρ1, . . . , ρn) where ρ1 is the first player in the order,
ρ2 the second player, etc. The player at position t is noted by ρ(t). The set of these orders is denoted by
RO (N); n! rank orders exist. The set of players before i in rank order ρ together with player i is called
Pi(ρ). The Shapley payoff of a player i is the average of the marginal contributions of i taken over all
rank orders of the players:
ϕi (N, v) =
1
n! ∑
ρ∈RO(N)
v (Pi (ρ))− v (Pi (ρ) \ {i}) . (1)
The ϕE value is based on the Shapley value. For the calculation of the ϕE value, we take
into account the statements of the players on excluded coalitions. The set of i’s excluded coalition
partners is denoted by Ei. A player excludes only coalitions to single players; |K| = 1, K ∈ Ei.
The set of coalitions that are not allowed based on Ei is called Xi, Xi := {K ⊆ N|K\ {i} ∈ Ei}
with |K| = 2. If i does not cooperate with j, we have Xi ∩ Xj = {i, j} , i.e., if a player i does
not cooperate with j, also j cannot cooperate with i. All inadmissible coalitions are denoted by
Γ :=
{
K ⊆ N| ∃ S ∈ Xj, j ∈ N, with S ⊆ K
}
. Thus, the admissible coalitions in the game (N, v) are
Ω := {K ⊆ N|K /∈ Γ} .The set of admissible coalitions containing player i is denoted by Ω (i) .
The tuple (N, v, Γ) is a game with excluded cooperation partners.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, E1 = {{2} , {3}}, E2 = {{1}} and E3 = {{1}} . From this, we obtain
the following sets Xi: X1 = {{1, 2} , {1, 3}} , X2 = {{1, 2}} , X3 = {{1, 3}} . From these sets, we
deduce the set of inadmissible coalitions Γ = {{1, 2} , {1, 3} , {1, 2, 3}} and the set of admissible coalitions
Ω = {
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, {1} , { } , {3} , {2, 3}} .
The ϕE value is one value for games with excluded cooperation partners. The primary idea of the
ϕE value is that only marginal contributions to admissible coalitions influence the players’ payoffs.
All supersets of excluded coalitions are inadmissible.
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Hence, the ϕE payoff for player i in (N, v, Γ) is calculated by [1]:
ϕEi (N, v, Γ) =
1
n! ∑
ρ∈RO(N), Pi(ρ)∈Ω
v (Pi (ρ))− v (Pi (ρ) \ {i}) . (2)
In the case of Γ =
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, we have ϕEi (N, v, Γ) = ϕi (N, v) .
3. Results
In this section, first we present some results on how excluding of coalitions affects the players’
payoffs. We start our analysis with general games like monotone games or symmetric games. After this,
we analyze apex games and glove games. Results on weighted majority games were drawn in [1].
For monotone games, we deduce from Equation (2):
Corollary 1. Let (N, v, Γ) be a monotone game with excluded cooperation partners. For i, j ∈ N, i 6= j such
that neither i ∈ Ej nor j ∈ Ei, {i, j} /∈ Γ, we have
ϕEi (N, v, Γ) ≥ ϕEi
(
N, v, Γ′
)
where {i, j} ∈ Γ′.
Hence, excluding coalitions reduces i’s ϕE payoff in monotone games.
In addition, we deduce from Equation (2) the next Corollary:
Corollary 2. Let (N, v, Γ) be a convex game with excluded cooperation partners. For i, j, l ∈ N, i 6= j 6= l
such that neither i ∈ Ej nor j ∈ Ei, {i, j} /∈ Γ, and neither i ∈ El nor l ∈ Ei, {i, l} /∈ Γ, we have
ϕEi (N, v, Γ)− ϕEi
(
N, v, Γ′
)
> ϕEi
(
N, v, Γ′
)
− ϕEi
(
N, v, Γ′′
)
where {i, l} ∈ Γ′, {i, l} ∈ Γ′′ and {i, j} ∈ Γ′′.
Hence, excluding the “first” player affects the ϕE payoff of player i more than excluding one
more pl yer.
With an example we show that superadditivity2 is not sufficient. Assume a game with excluded
cooperation partners with N = {1, 2, 3} , v ({1}) = 0, v ({2}) = 2, v ({3}) = 1, v ({1, 2}) = 2,
v ({1, 3}) = 4, v ({2, 3}) = 5, v (N) = 6 and Γ =
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. The game is superadditive but not convex. Table 1
shows the marginal contributions and the resulting ϕE payoff for player 1. In a first step, cooperation
with player 2 is excluded. In the next step (last column), cooperation with 3 is excluded additionally.
Table 1. superadditive game with excluded coalitions.
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Γ = {{1, 2}, N} Γ = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, N}
1, 2, 3 0 0 0
1, 3, 2 0 0 0
2, 1, 3 0 − −
2, 3, 1 1 − −
3, 1, 2 3 3 −
3, 2, 1 1 − −
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In the next step, we analyze symmetric games. From Theorem 16 in [1], we deduce the
following Corollary:
Corollary 3. Let (N, v, Γ) be a symmetric game with excluded cooperation partners. For i, j ∈ N, i 6= j such
that neither i ∈ Ej nor j ∈ Ei, {i, j} /∈ Γ, we have
ϕEi (N, v, Γ)− ϕEi
(
N, v, Γ′
)
= ϕEj (N, v, Γ)− ϕEj
(
N, v, Γ′
)
.
where {i, j} ∈ Γ′.
Both players’ ϕE payoffs are affected in the same way. Corollary 3 is similar to properties of other
values like the balanced contributions axiom of the Shapley value [12], the property of fair gain from
bilateral links [3] or the splitting axiom of the χ value [7]. Corollary 4 is deduced from Theorem 17
in [1]. It presents the impact of the number of excluded coalitions in a symmetric game.
Corollary 4. Let (N, v, Γ) be a monotone symmetric game with excluded cooperation partners with n > 2.
For i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, such that |Ei| >
∣∣Ej∣∣ we have
ϕEj (N, v, Γ) > ϕ
E
i (N, v, Γ) .
Hence, players with a higher number of excluded coalitions have lower ϕE payoffs than do
players with less number of excluded coalitions.
The apex game was introduced by [13]. An overview about the existing literature on apex games
is provided by [14]. The apex game is defined for n ≥ 2. There is one apex player io. The other players
are minor ones. All coalitions which contain io and at least one minor player as well the coalition
which contains all minor players get the worth of 1 while all other coalitions get zero. This game could
be interpreted as a team situation in firms where io is the manager. He needs at least one team member
to create a worth.
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for all i ∈ N. For all
l, m ∈ N\ {io} , l 6= m, we have
ϕEl (N, v, Γ)− ϕ
E
l
(
N, v, Γ′
)
= ϕEm (N, v, Γ)− ϕEm
(
N, v, Γ′
)
where {i, j} ∈ Γ′, i, j ∈ N\ {io} .
Proof. Without excluded coalitions, the players’ ϕE payoffs are:
ϕEi0 (N, v, Γ) = ϕi0 (N, v) =
n− 2
n
(3)
ϕEl (N, v, Γ) = ϕl (N, v) =
1− n−2n
n− 1 =
2
n (n− 1)
with l ∈ N\ {io} . The player i0 does not obtain the marginal contribution 1 in the rank orders
at positions 1 and n. In n − 2 from n possible positions, he obtains the marginal contribution 1.
The remaining marginal contributions 1− n−2n are divided equally to the minor players. Excluding a
coalition between i, j ∈ N\ {io} prevents the possibility for all minor players, to obtain the marginal
contribution 1 at position n− 1. Since all minor players are symmetric, their ϕE payoffs are affected to
the same extent. The possibility to obtain the marginal contribution 1 at the second position, if player
i0 is at first position, is unchanged for the minor players.
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Excluding coalitions between j and i affects the ϕE payoffs of all players l ∈ N\ {io} in the
same way. Hence, all minor players have a common interest that all of them are willing to cooperate.
The next Corollary follows directly:
Corollary 5. Let (N, v, Γ) be an apex game with excluded cooperation partners with i, j ∈ N\ {io} , i 6= j,
such that i ∈ Ej (and/or j ∈ Ei). For all l ∈ N\ {io} we have
ϕEl (N, v, Γ) = ϕ
E
l
(
N, v, Γ′
)
where {i, m} ∈ Γ′, m ∈ N\ {io, i, j} and i ∈ N\ {io}.
After excluding a coalition between i, j ∈ N\ {io} , the minor players obtain only a marginal
contribution 1 at the second position, if player i0 is at first position. With excluding further coalitions
between minor players this possibility is not affected. Hence, if one coalition between minor players is
excluded, further exclusions of coalitions between the minor players do not change their ϕE payoffs.
The last game analyzed is the so-called glove game [15]. In this game, each player owns either
one left glove or one right glove. A single glove has no worth; a pair of gloves has a worth of one.
Hence, this game models markets where sellers and buyers deal. The coalitional function for this game
is given by
v (K) = min {|K ∩ L| , |K ∩ R|} with N = R ∪ L, R ∩ L = ∅, (4)
where L (R) denotes the set of left (right) glove owners. The worth of a coalition equals the number of
matching pairs it contains.
Corollary 6. Let (N, v, Γ) be a glove game with excluded cooperation partners with |R| = |L| and Ei =
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for
all i ∈ N. For i, j ∈ N, i 6= j with i ∈ L, j ∈ R we have
ϕEi (N, v, Γ)− ϕEi
(
N, v, Γ′
)
= ϕEj (N, v, Γ)− ϕEj
(
N, v, Γ′
)
where {i, j} ∈ Γ′.
Without excluded coalitions, the players’ ϕE payoffs are:
ϕEj (N, v, Γ) = ϕ
E
i (N, v, Γ) = ϕi (N, v) =
1
2
. (5)
Both types of players are symmetric. Excluding coalitions between j and i, i ∈ L, j ∈ R, affects both
players to the same extent; they stay symmetric. Hence, on symmet ic markets with an equal number
of players on each market side, excluding a coalition with a player from the opposite side of the market
reduces the players’ ϕE payoffs in an equal way.
Now, we analyze asymmetric glove games with |R| < |L| :
Theorem 2. Let (N, v, Γ) be a glove game with excluded cooperation partners with |R| < |L| and Ei =
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5
for
all i ∈ N. For i, j ∈ N, i 6= j with i ∈ L, j ∈ R we have
ϕEj (N, v, Γ)− ϕEj
(
N, v, Γ′
)
> ϕEi (N, v, Γ)− ϕEi
(
N, v, Γ′
)
where {i, j} ∈ Γ′.
Proof. Without excluded coalitions, we have [15]
ϕj (N, v) = ϕEj (N, v, Γ) > ϕ
E
i (N, v, Γ) = ϕi (N, v) (6)
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i ∈ L, j ∈ R, |R| < |L| . The players in R obtain the marginal contribution 1 in more rank orders then
the players in L. Excluding coalitions between i and j reduces the number of admissible rank orders
for both players to the same extent; i.e., we have |Ω′ (i)| − |Ω (i)| = |Ω′ (j)| − |Ω (j)| . The number of
rank orders that evoke a marginal contribution 1 is reduced for both players in a proportional way
with respect to the initial situation with Γ =
‷ U+2037 \backtrprime
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5
. Hence absolutely, player j loses a higher number of
rank orders with marginal contribution 1 then player i.
Hence, excluding coalitions on asymmetric markets affects the ϕE payoffs of the scarce side of the
market to a higher extend.
4. Discussion
In this article, we analyzed properties of the ϕE value for some classes of games. For further
research, the following theoretical lines of development could be interesting. Since a large body of
literature deals with axiomatizations of the Shapley value, one possible purpose is to develop new
axiomatizations of the ϕE value and to compare them. In addition, the effects of excluding coalitions
could be analyz in the framework of other structures of cooperative game theory like partitions [16,17],
levels [18,19], networks [3,20] or hierarchies [21–23]. nother theoretical development could be a
modified version of the ϕE value that is based on other value-like solution concepts of cooperative
game theory [24]. Additionally, the issue of refusing cooperation could be analyzed for value-like
solution concepts like the core. One last suggested theoretical development could be the application of
the concept of stability [6] to the set of excluded coalitions.
Another line of research is the experimental one. With this research one could check if the payoffs
determined by the ϕE value are realistic and, hence, if the ϕE alue is an appropriate way to model
economic ituations.
With respect to strategic applications of excluded coalitions [10,11], a two step model could
be analyzed.3 After the decision on the excluded coalitions (the set of inadmissible coalitions Γ),
the players’ ϕE payoff result. For the games analyzed in Section 3, it is a dominant strategy to
state Ei =
‷ U+2037 \backtrprime
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and the Shapley payoffs
result. For further research, an interesting topic could be the analysis of cooperative games with less
symmetric assumptions (see [26], for example) and non-cooperative games with negotiations between
players after determining their strategies (i.e., sequential decisions on Ei). In particular, our results
on the apex game (all minor players are affect adversely if one f them refuse cooperation with i0)
and asymmetric gl ve markets (the shorter side of the market is mor affected than the longer side)
indicate fruitful research.
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